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RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, Plaintiff-Appellants make the following 
disclosures: 
Plaintiff-Appellant UMG Recordings, Inc. discloses that Vivendi S.A. is a 
parent corporation of UMG Recordings, Inc.  Plaintiff-Appellant UMG Recordings, 
Inc. further discloses that Vivendi S.A. owns 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Capitol Records, LLC discloses that Vivendi S.A. is a 
parent corporation of Capitol Records, LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant Capitol Records, 
LLC further discloses that Vivendi S.A. owns 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Warner Bros. Records, Inc. discloses that Warner 
Music Group Corporation and Access Industries, Inc. are parent corporations of 
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.  Plaintiff-Appellant Warner Bros. Records, Inc. further 
discloses that there are no publicly held corporations that own 10% or more if its 
stock. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Atlantic Recording Corporation discloses that Warner 
Music Group Corporation and Access Industries, Inc. are parent corporations of 
Atlantic Recording Corporation.  Plaintiff-Appellant Atlantic Recording 
Corporation further discloses that there are no publicly held corporations that own 
10% or more if its stock. 
ii 
Plaintiff-Appellant Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. discloses that 
Warner Music Group Corporation and Access Industries, Inc. are parent 
corporations of Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.  Plaintiff-Appellant Elektra 
Entertainment Group, Inc. further discloses that there are no publicly held 
corporations that own 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Fueled by Ramen LLC discloses that Warner Music 
Group Corporation and Access Industries, Inc. are parent corporations of Fueled by 
Ramen LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant Fueled by Ramen LLC further discloses that there 
are no publicly held corporations that own 10% or more if its stock.  
 Plaintiff-Appellant Nonesuch Records, Inc. discloses that Warner Music 
Group Corporation and Access Industries, Inc. are parent corporations of Nonesuch 
Records, Inc.  Plaintiff-Appellant Nonesuch Records, Inc. further discloses that there 
are no publicly held corporations that own 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Sony Music Entertainment discloses that Sony 
Corporation is a parent corporation of Sony Music Entertainment.  Plaintiff-
Appellant Sony Music Entertainment further discloses that Sony Corporation owns 
10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Sony Music Entertainment US Latin LLC discloses 
that Sony Corporation is a parent corporation of Sony Music Entertainment US Latin 
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LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant Sony Music Entertainment US Latin LLC further discloses 
that Sony Corporation owns 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Arista Records LLC discloses that Sony Corporation is 
a parent corporation of Arista Records LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant Arista Records 
LLC further discloses that Sony Corporation owns 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant LaFace Records LLC discloses that Sony Corporation 
is a parent corporation of LaFace Records LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant LaFace Records 
LLC further discloses that Sony Corporation owns 10% or more if its stock. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Zomba Recording LLC discloses that Sony 
Corporation is a parent corporation of Zomba Recording LLC.  Plaintiff-Appellant 
Zomba Recording LLC further discloses that Sony Corporation owns 10% or more 
if its stock. 
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FLVTO.biz and 2conv.com are music piracy websites owned and operated by 
appellee Tofig Kurbanov that engage in, and enable, illegal copyright infringement 
on a massive scale.  Those websites provide users with an easy and virtually 
instantaneous means of isolating the audio portion of a music video from a site such 
as YouTube, and converting the audio into a file that users can download—a process 
known as “stream-ripping.”  Stream-ripping allows both the websites and their users 
to access copyrighted sound recordings without permission and without 
compensating the copyright owners.  Unsurprisingly, the websites are wildly popular 
with users in Virginia and across the United States.  In 2018, alone, the websites had 
almost 32 million United States users who, collectively, conducted over 96 million 
stream-ripping sessions and downloaded hundreds of millions of songs from 
defendants’ servers to their own personal devices in the United States.  That makes 
the United States one of appellee’s most important global markets, ranked third both 
by number of users and number of sessions.   
This massive U.S. customer base is no surprise to appellee—he is well aware 
of the location of his users and the extent of their piracy.  But rather than using that 
information to block or otherwise limit the access of U.S. users, appellee instead 
operates his websites to profit handsomely from that U.S. customer base.  Like many 
other successful online ventures—both legitimate and illegitimate—appellee’s 
2 
websites and their advertisers track the location of their users, which in turn allows 
the advertisers on appellee’s websites to target viewers in (for example) a specific 
country or state, tailoring the content of advertisements to maximize their relevance 
and appeal.  The websites thus can, and do, earn substantial revenues through 
advertising targeted specifically to tens of millions of annual users in the United 
States. 
Seeking to restrict this massive infringement, U.S. record companies that 
collectively own the copyrights to the vast majority of sound recordings licensed and 
sold in the United States sued Kurbanov, a Russian national, in the Eastern District 
of Virginia.
1
  Kurbanov contended that the exercise of personal jurisdiction, not just 
in Virginia but anywhere in the United States, would “offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice,” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), that are designed 
to ensure that a defendant is not “haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated,’ contacts.”  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation omitted).  Remarkably, the district court agreed, 
concluding that appellee could not “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in 
                                           
1
 Appellants also filed suit against 10 Doe defendants whom the record companies 
allege, on information and belief, are involved with the operation of the websites.  
J.A. 3, 15.  Because these defendants have not appeared and have yet to be identified, 
appellants will refer solely to Appellee Kurbanov for simplicity. 
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Virginia or, indeed, anywhere in the United States.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
That was error.  There is nothing random, fortuitous, or attenuated about 
appellee’s contacts with Virginia or with the United States.  And appellee cannot 
seriously contend that he lacks “fair warning” that he might be sued in U.S. courts 
under U.S. law when he violates U.S. copyrights by transmitting hundreds of 
millions of infringing files to U.S. devices on U.S. soil, and then profits from ads 
targeted to his U.S. customer base.  Appellee has “used [his] website to engage in 
sizeable and continuing commerce with United States customers,” and as a result 
“should not be surprised at United States-based litigation.”  Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. 
Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2018).  There is no other case holding that 
it violates due process to assert specific jurisdiction over a defendant with such deep 
contacts in what he knows to be his third-biggest market world-wide, and there is no 
case holding unconstitutional the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
with contacts that are so numerous and substantial. 
For good reason.  The result of the district court’s ruling is that the only court 
in which U.S. record companies can bring suit to challenge millions of instances of 
U.S.-based online piracy is in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, where Kurbanov purportedly 
resides.  The district court’s decision thus gives carte blanche to Internet pirates to 
set up shop outside of the United States, safe in the knowledge that they are 
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effectively immune from the reach of U.S. courts seeking to vindicate the rights of 
U.S. plaintiffs for violations of U.S. copyright law, even as they cater to U.S. users.  
The law of personal jurisdiction is not intended to support such a result.  
International Shoe and its progeny are intended to prevent a state from overreaching 
by asserting jurisdiction over entities with little or no connection to the State; they 
were never intended to insulate a massive, unlawful, on-line business from liability 
anywhere in the United States for harms arising out of its commercial transactions 
with tens of millions of U.S. users.  That is not fair play and substantial justice, but 
rather lawlessness and injustice.   
The judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
district court exercised jurisdiction over the underlying copyright dispute pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).  J.A. 12.  On January 22, 2019, the district court 
granted Kurbanov’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction—a final and 
appealable order—and entered final judgment the same day.  J.A. 395-96.  
Appellants timely filed their Notice of Appeal on January 29, 2019.  J.A. 397.   
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Whether the district court erred in finding it lacked specific personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign-based defendant whose websites not only infringe U.S. 
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copyrights, but also enable massive infringement by U.S. users, transmit hundreds 
of millions of files onto U.S. devices, and generate substantial revenues from 
advertising that targets U.S. users. 
2.  Whether the district court erred by refusing to grant appellants an 
opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants are twelve record companies that produce, distribute, and license 
85% of all legitimate commercial sound recordings in the United States.  See J.A. 
14, 115.  Appellee is a Russian national who owns and operates two of the most 
notorious music piracy websites in the world, FLVTO.biz and 2conv.com 
(“FLVTO” and “2conv” or, together, the “websites”).  J.A. 15, 67-68.  Through these 
websites, appellee offers users a “stream-ripping” service through which audio 
tracks are extracted from videos streamed over the Internet, converted into 
downloadable files (such as mp3s), and then transmitted to users.  In light of the 
enormous harms caused by appellee’s stream-ripping services, appellants sued 
appellee under the federal Copyright Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia. 
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I. Factual Background 
A. Stream-Ripping 
Appellants license the rights to perform their copyrighted works to Internet-
based streaming services, which allow users to listen to sound recordings online but 
do not give users access to a permanent digital copy of the works.  J.A. 10, 14-15.  
These services have different business models—some based on advertising and 
others on paid subscriptions—but all have in common that the licensee pays 
appellants for the right to use their works.  Appellants have reached licensing 
agreements with popular streaming services such as Apple Music, Pandora, Spotify, 
and, most relevant here, YouTube (www.youtube.com), an online video-streaming 
service that is also the largest on-demand music service in the world.  J.A. 15.  
YouTube and other streaming services employ sophisticated technology to 
prevent users from downloading or copying the videos available on its website.  But 
Internet pirates, including appellee, have found ways to illegally circumvent these 
safeguards.  J.A. 16-24.  And, once the control measures are circumvented, pirates 
can gain access to the audiovisual files, make unauthorized copies of the audio 
portions of those files, and then distribute those copies over the Internet.  This 
process of capturing the music portion of digital videos streamed over the Internet is 
known as “stream-ripping.”  J.A. 9, 17.   
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Stream-ripping services offer permanent, downloadable, copies of songs that 
users could otherwise only stream on websites like Spotify and YouTube, and they 
offer users a free alternative to paying for physical copies of sound recordings or 
digital downloads available on services such as iTunes.  J.A. 17.  For that reason, 
stream-ripping services cause record companies to lose substantial revenues.  J.A. 
17-18.  The scale and scope of the problem is astounding.  Stream-ripping has 
quickly become the most popular form of music piracy in the world.  J.A. 9, 17.  
Nearly half of all Internet users between the ages of 16 and 24 regularly use stream-
ripping to acquire music, and stream-ripping services illegally copy and distribute 
tens of millions—or even hundreds of millions—of tracks every month.  Id.  
B. Appellee’s websites 
FLVTO and 2conv are two of the most popular stream-ripping websites in the 
world; indeed, they are among the most popular websites of any kind on the Internet.  
J.A. 10.  For the three-month period running from July to September 2018, FLVTO 
and 2conv were (respectively) the 264th and 829th most popular out of the hundreds 
of millions of websites on the Internet.  J.A. 144-56.   
The reason for the websites’ popularity is not hard to understand.  Like other 
stream-ripping services, appellee’s websites make online piracy available at the click 
of a button.  J.A. 18-23, 76.  As appellee himself boasts, in English, the websites 
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“make[] converting streaming videos to MP3 online easier and faster than ever.”  
J.A. 76.  
To begin, a user enters a publicly available web address for a YouTube video 
at the FLVTO homepage or on the FLVTO mobile app.  J.A. 18-23, 76.  The user 
then chooses the desired file format (e.g., mp3, mp4, or avi) and clicks “Convert.”  
Id.  In a matter of seconds, FLVTO reaches out to YouTube’s servers, circumvents 
YouTube’s technological safeguards, and illegally copies the file.  It then converts 
the audio track into the type of file selected by the user.  J.A. 21-22, 76.  The result 
is a permanent and unauthorized copy of the sound recording found in the video.  
J.A. 22.  FLVTO then presents the user with a “download” link, and, when the user 
clicks on that download link, FLVTO transmits the resulting copy directly from its 
servers to the user’s phone or home computer.  J.A. 21-22, 76.  2conv uses the same 
basic process for its music piracy.  J.A. 20, 22. 
C. Appellee’s contacts with Virginia and the United States 
Appellee’s websites operate on a massive scale in Virginia and the United 
States as a whole, and appellee has taken steps specifically to exploit these markets.   
1. The number of users and extent of data exchanged  
According to appellee’s own data, FLVTO had 26.3 million users in the 
United States between October 2017 and September 2018.  J.A. 87.  That includes 
448,426 users in Virginia.  J.A. 88.  2conv had 5.37 million users in the United States 
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and 94,342 users in Virginia during the same period.  J.A. 78-79.  Collectively, 
appellee’s websites had nearly 32 million users in the United States (nearly 10% of 
the country’s population) and more than half a million users in Virginia (more than 
6% of the commonwealth’s population) in the past year alone.  J.A. 78-79, 87-88.  
Between October 2017 and September 2018, the United States was the third largest 
market for appellee’s websites in terms of total number of users and total number of 
visits.  See J.A. 78, 87.  Within the United States, Virginia was FLVTO’s 13th largest 
market, and 2conv’s 11th largest market.  J.A. 78-79, 87-88.   
The websites’ users visit frequently, resulting in a staggering amount of data 
exchanged between the websites and users in the United States and Virginia.  Based 
on appellee’s own data, FLVTO attracted 84.1 million visits from its users in the 
United States between October 2017 and September 2018, including 1.17 million 
visits from users located in Virginia.  J.A. 87-88.  Over the same period, 2conv 
attracted 12.1 million visits from users in the United States and 187,486 visits from 
users in Virginia.  J.A. 78-79.  According to SimilarWeb estimates, between July 
2018 and September 2018, the average FLVTO user spent six minutes and fifty-two 
seconds on the FLVTO website, visiting over eight pages each visit.  J.A. 149.  Given 
that the process for ripping an individual song takes only seconds, the time users 
actually spent on FLVTO was sufficient to download multiple audio files.  See J.A. 
18-20.  2conv users displayed similar behavior.  J.A. 154. 
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Assuming conservatively that the average user downloaded only one file per 
visit, appellee’s websites sent more than 96 million files into the United States in the 
past year alone.  Likewise, assuming that Virginia users downloaded one file per 
visit, the websites sent more than 1.35 million files into the Commonwealth during 
this same period.  See J.A. 78-79, 87-88, 149, 154.  Appellants have alleged that all 
or substantially all of these file transfers involve infringing copies of copyrighted 
sound recordings.  J.A. 10, 17, 23-24.  As is evident from the granular location-based 
data, appellee has full knowledge of where his users are located.  J.A. 78-94.  
2. Geo-targeted advertisements 
Although users do not pay money for appellee’s stream-ripping services, 
FLVTO and 2conv are very much commercial enterprises.  Like many websites, 
FLVTO and 2conv derive their revenue from the advertisements they host.  J.A. 11, 
25, 41, 70.  Based on their investigation, appellants alleged the websites featured 
advertisements that targeted users based on the users’ specific location, including 
the United States and Virginia.  J.A. 11.  This form of advertising, known as “geo-
targeting,” is intended to maximize the number of visitors who click on an 
advertisement appearing on appellee’s websites (the “click-through rate”), id., the 
theory being that Virginians (for example) are more likely to click on ads that are 
specifically targeted to a Virginia audience.  The higher the click-through rate, the 
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more valuable the advertising space on appellee’s websites and thus the greater 
appellee’s revenues.  Id.    
Appellee conceded that third-party advertisers may be targeting specific 
advertisements to users in specific locations.  J.A. 70.  Although appellee insists that 
he has no role in selecting the particular advertisements on his websites, the record 
indicates that appellee plays an instrumental role in collecting the location data 
needed for geo-targeting.  J.A. 70, 176, 178.  In the privacy policies that appear on 
FLVTO and 2conv, appellee represents to users that he may collect “your IP address, 
country of origin and other non-personal information about your computer or 
device” and that the information may be used “to provide targeted advertising based 
on your country of origin and other personal information.”  J.A. 176, 178 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, the privacy policies indicate that appellee himself collects 
location data about his users and then passes that information on to advertisers.  J.A. 
11, 176, 178.  To the extent those advertisers place geo-targeted advertisements on 
the websites, the underlying location data comes from appellee.  J.A. 176, 178.   
3. Business contacts 
In addition to knowingly transmitting millions of files into the United States 
and Virginia and facilitating geo-targeted advertising to the millions of Americans 
and Virginians downloading these files, appellee has numerous other contacts—
including with the U.S. government—to facilitate his online piracy operations. 
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First, appellee has registered a DMCA agent with the U.S. Copyright Office.  
See J.A. 164, 172.  The sole purpose for such a registration is to seek to qualify for 
the DMCA’s safe harbor defense if a defendant is sued for copyright infringement 
under U.S. law in U.S. courts.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c).   
Second, appellee does business with at least one American advertising broker 
to sell space on his websites for targeted advertisements—Advertise.com, based in 
Sherman Oaks, California.  J.A. 118, 151, 154, 183, 185. 
Third, appellee registered the domain names “FLVTO” and “2conv” through 
GoDaddy.com—an American domain-name registrar.  J.A. 187.  Appellee also 
selected top-level domains (the suffixes “.com” and “.biz”) that are administered by 
companies headquartered in Virginia.  Id. 
Fourth, until recently, appellee contracted with Amazon Web Services to host 
his websites on front-end servers in the United States.  J.A. 73, 118, 132-33.  For a 
significant period of time, including within the three-year limitations period that 
applies to the record companies’ claims, those front-end servers were located in 
Ashburn, Virginia.  J.A. 12, 73, 118, 132-33.   
4. Terms of Use  
Finally, although users do not have to register to use appellee’s websites, they 
must agree to the websites’ Terms of Use before they can download any audio files.  
J.A. 19, 20, 76, 158, 168.  The websites explain that the Terms of Use “constitute a 
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contractual agreement between you [the user] and us” and that they give appellee 
“the right to take appropriate action against any user . . . including civil, criminal, 
and injunctive redress” against the user.  J.A. 158, 168.  Users further agree that 
“[f]or any claim brought by us against you, you agree to submit and consent to 
personal jurisdiction in and the venue of the courts in the Russian Federation and 
anywhere else you can be found.”  J.A. 166, 174.  In other words, appellee reserves 
the right to file suit against his users in Virginia courts and in the courts of the United 
States.   
II. Procedural History 
On August 3, 2018, appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging five separate violations of the Copyright 
Act.  J.A. 4, 8, 25-32.  In their complaint, appellants alleged the district court had 
specific jurisdiction under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) because of 
appellee’s contacts with Virginia and, in the alternative, under Rule 4(k)(2), because 
of appellee’s contacts with the United States as a whole.  See J.A. 12.  Appellee 
appeared through counsel and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).  J.A. 5, 35-36, 38-39.  In the alternative, appellee 
asked the district court to transfer the case to the Central District of California.  J.A. 
39, 59-64.   
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The district court (Hilton, J.) granted appellee’s motion to dismiss and ignored 
(and thus denied) appellants’ alternative request for jurisdictional discovery.  J.A. 
135, 382-96.  Purporting to apply the framework originally set forth in Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), the 
district court held the websites were “semi-interactive” rather than “highly 
interactive” because there was no “ongoing, developed relationship between users 
and the Websites.”  J.A. 392.  The district court reasoned “there is no evidence that 
users exchanged multiple files with the Websites.”  Id.  The district court also found 
“the number of users cannot make a website highly interactive, there must instead 
be numerous transactions between the site and a user evidencing an ongoing 
relationship.”  Id. 
Next, the district court found that appellee and his users did not have a 
“commercial relationship.”  J.A. 393.  The district court recognized appellants’ 
allegation that appellee used tracking technology to identify the specific location of 
all his users and that this information was available to advertisers for the purposes 
of geo-targeted advertising.  The district court nevertheless found the existence of 
advertising irrelevant:  “The revenue from the advertisements cannot be the basis for 
finding a commercial relationship with the users because they are separate 
interactions and the due process analysis must only look at the acts from which the 
cause of action arises, here, the alleged aid in music piracy.”  Id. 
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Finally, the district court held that appellee “took no action through the 
Websites that would demonstrate purposeful targeting of Virginia or the United 
States.”  J.A. 393.  The court observed that users initiate contact with the websites 
and thus deemed this use “unilateral in nature and as such cannot be the basis for 
jurisdiction without more.”  J.A. 393.  As the district court put it, “[u]sers may access 
the websites from anywhere on the globe and they select their location when they 
use the Websites . . .  Even if the Websites’ servers knew exactly where the users 
were located, any interaction would still be in the unilateral control of the users as 
they initiate the contacts.”  J.A. 393-94.  
Appellants filed this timely appeal.  J.A. 397-98. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants have established a prima facie case that the district court had 
specific personal jurisdiction over appellee under Rule 4(k)(1) or, in the alternative, 
4(k)(2).  Appellee’s contacts with Virginia and the United States simply cannot be 
characterized as “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”  To the contrary, appellee has 
more than purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in 
these fora, and thus had “fair warning” that his activities could “subject [him] to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.  In concluding 
that appellee could not “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in Virginia or 
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the United States, the district court misapplied basic rules regarding the scope of 
personal jurisdiction and reached a result that is as erroneous as it is unjust.  
First, in determining whether a foreign defendant has “purposefully availed” 
itself of the privilege of doing business within a jurisdiction, courts look to the 
quantity of the defendant’s contacts with that jurisdiction.  The extent of appellee’s 
contacts is extraordinary:  In 2018, alone, the websites had nearly 32 million users 
in the United States conducting 96.2 million sessions, and 542,768 users in Virginia 
conducting 1.4 million sessions.  Absolute numbers aside, the United States is 
appellee’s third biggest market globally, a fact well known to appellee as is evident 
from the exhibits he entered into the record in the district court.  As the Supreme 
Court recognized in Keeton, there is nothing unfair or surprising about requiring a 
defendant to defend himself in a jurisdiction in which he knows he has thousands 
(as in Keeton) or millions (as here) of contacts.  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984).  Other courts have routinely found personal 
jurisdiction based on far fewer contacts. 
Second, not only does appellee have millions of users in the United States and 
hundreds of thousands in Virginia, but those users’ contacts with the websites are 
repeated and interactive.  Far from a “passive” website that simply makes 
information generally available on the Internet, the websites here engage in a back-
and-forth with users resulting in the transmission of substantial amounts of computer 
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files and data from defendant’s servers to users’ personal devices.  Moreover, as a 
condition of engaging in a stream-ripping session, users must agree to what the 
websites term “a contractual agreement,” only further demonstrating the substantial 
nature of the websites’ contacts with users in the United States and Virginia. 
Third, appellee earns substantial revenue precisely because of his targeting of 
the United States and Virginia.  The fact that the websites are “free” to users is 
irrelevant.  By visiting the websites tens of millions of times, users form an important 
dedicated audience from whom appellee profits through the sale of geo-targeted 
advertisements.  As his own terms and conditions make clear, appellee requires users 
to agree that he can collect information on their location for the purpose of 
“provid[ing] targeted advertising.”  And as appellants have alleged, he does 
precisely that—facilitating the targeting of specific ads to specific geographies.  
Equally revealing is what appellee does not do:  use the information he has regarding 
the location of his users to block users in the United States or Virginia. 
Fourth, beyond his sustained contacts with his U.S.- and Virginia-based users, 
appellee has a host of additional contacts with these jurisdictions.  Appellee has, for 
example, registered a DMCA agent with the U.S. Copyright Office—the only 
purpose of which is to seek to qualify for the DMCA’s safe harbor defense to claims 
of copyright infringement in U.S. courts.  In addition, appellee has used a U.S.-based 
advertising firm, U.S.-based domain and top-level domain registers and, until 
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recently, U.S.-based servers.  Moreover, as a condition of using the websites, 
appellee requires users to consent to jurisdiction “anywhere else you can be found,” 
i.e., the courts of the United States for almost 32 million Americans.  These actions 
provide only further proof, if it were needed, that appellee cannot claim surprise at 
being haled into U.S. or Virginia courts. 
Because the district court erroneously determined that appellee had not 
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the United 
States or Virginia, the court did not address the remaining two prongs of the test for 
personal jurisdiction.  These are easily satisfied.  Appellants’ claims arise from 
activities directed at the United States and Virginia; namely, the massive violations 
of the Copyright Act in these fora facilitated by the websites.  And, exercise of 
jurisdiction here is reasonable.  Appellee has not only conducted a highly successful 
business in the United States and Virginia, but has also secured able counsel who 
have defended him with success to date.  Virginia and the United States have a strong 
interest in the subject matter of this litigation and in preventing foreign pirates from 
violating U.S. copyrights with impunity within their borders.  And, appellants have 
a strong interest in resolving this dispute in the United States or Virginia given that 
this case involves the violation of U.S. copyrights, by U.S. users, on U.S. soil.  It 
simply cannot be that the only court in which appellants can vindicate their U.S. 
copyright claims is located in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. 
19 
Finally, should this Court have any doubt that personal jurisdiction is properly 
exercised over appellee, it should remand the case for the district court to conduct 
jurisdictional discovery.  The record contains a wealth of information regarding 
appellee’s contacts with the United States and Virginia.  This is certainly enough to 
make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and thus provides a sufficient 
basis upon which to order discovery. 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), 
the plaintiff generally bears the burden to establish the district court’s jurisdiction 
over the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.  Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 
673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989).  A plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction by presenting facts that, if true, would support jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 561 (4th Cir. 
2014).  The prima facie standard is a “tolerant” one, under which a court “must 
construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of 
jurisdiction.”  Combs, 886 F.2d at 676-77; see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst 
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).  The court must also 
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construe all disputed factual issues in the plaintiff’s favor.  See, e.g., Universal 
Leather, 773 F.3d at 560. 
This Court reviews a district court’s determination that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction de novo.  Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber 
Co., Ltd., 682 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2012); CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. 
Analysts of India, 551 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009).   
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to deny plaintiffs an opportunity 
to conduct jurisdictional discovery for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Carefirst, 
334 F.3d at 402-03.  When a plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest the 
existence of discovery with reasonable particularity and shows that jurisdictional 
discovery would supplement its allegations, a district court abuses its discretion by 
denying the plaintiff an opportunity to conduct any discovery at all.  See Toys “R” 
Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003); GTE New Media Servs. 
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
II. The District Court in Virginia, and Courts in the United States, Can 
Constitutionally Exercise Jurisdiction over Appellee. 
The district court found it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellee because 
appellee did not “purposefully avail[] [him]self of the privilege of conducting 
activities in” the United States or Virginia.  J.A. 388.  That ruling allows two foreign 
websites to profit by targeting ads at U.S. users who use the websites to infringe U.S. 
copyrights millions of times by transmitting copyrighted materials onto U.S. soil, 
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while requiring any copyright lawsuit to be brought not in the websites’ third-largest 
market but instead in appellee’s hometown of Rostov-on-Don, Russia.  This decision 
finds no support in logic or in law. 
Appellants asserted jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1) and, in the alternative, 
under Rule 4(k)(2).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1), (2).  Rule 4(k)(1) provides that “a 
federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the manner 
provided by state law.”  ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 
707, 710 (4th Cir. 2002).  Thus, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
defendant “if such jurisdiction is authorized by the long-arm statute of the state in 
which it sits and the application of the long-arm statute is consistent with the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. 
Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 2009).  Under Virginia’s long-arm 
statute, personal jurisdiction is proper “if the asserted cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ 
the non-resident defendant’s ‘[t]ransacting business’ in Virginia.”  Id. (quoting Va. 
Code Ann. § 8.01-328.1(A)(1)) (alterations in original).  “Because Virginia’s long-
arm statute is intended to extend personal jurisdiction to the extent permissible under 
the due process clause,” the statutory inquiry “merges” with the constitutional 
question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
comports with due process.  Id. (citing Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 
261 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
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Rule 4(k)(2) is an important complement to Rule 4(k)(1).  It is “in essence a 
federal long-arm statute” that closes a jurisdictional loophole that had effectively 
rendered immune from suit in the United States defendants who had sufficient 
contacts with the United States as a whole, but not with any one State.  Saudi v. 
Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 2005).  To invoke 
jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), a plaintiff must show (1) that its claim “arises under 
federal law;” (2) that the defendant is “not subject to the jurisdiction in any state’s 
courts of general jurisdiction;” and (3) that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is 
“consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(k)(2); see also Base Metals Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum 
Factory”, 283 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2002).   
The first two factors are easily met here.  As to the first, appellee does not 
dispute that appellants’ claims, brought under the federal Copyright Act, arise under 
federal law.  See J.A. 25-32.  As to the second, appellants have acknowledged that 
appellee’s contacts with every state in the country “are essentially the same as his 
contacts with Virginia,” and thus if there is no jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1) in 
Virginia, there would be no jurisdiction in any other State.  J.A. 130.
2
  Moreover, 
                                           
2
 This Court has held that a plaintiff may not proceed under Rule 4(k)(2) when the 
plaintiff is both asserting jurisdiction over the defendant in another state and 
claiming in this Court that no other court has jurisdiction.  See Base Metals, 283 F.3d 
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appellee has plainly averred that he is not subject to jurisdiction in any state in the 
country.  See J.A. 59 (“Mr. Kurbanov does not believe that personal jurisdiction can 
be exercised over him in either Virginia or the United States as a whole consistent 
with the Due Process requirements of the Constitution.”).  The second factor of Rule 
4(k)(2) is thus satisfied.
3
  Like the Rule 4(k)(1) inquiry, therefore, the Rule (4)(k)(2) 
inquiry merges with the due process analysis. 
                                           
at 215-16; Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 599-
600 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“GMAC”).  That is not what appellants are doing here, as this 
is the only case in the United States that appellants have pending against appellee.  
3
 There is a split among the Circuits as to the proper framework for deciding that the 
defendant is “not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of 
any state” as Rule 4(k)(2) requires.  In the majority of Circuits, the burden is on the 
defendant:  “A defendant who wants to preclude use of Rule 4(k)(2) has only to 
name some other state in which the suit could proceed.”  ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden 
Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Oldfield v. Pueblo 
De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1218 n. 22 (11th Cir. 2009); Holland Am. Line 
Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007); Mwani v. bin Laden, 
417 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 
F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004); Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 
1414 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In the First Circuit, by contrast, the plaintiff must “certify” 
that “the defendant is not subject to suit in the courts of general jurisdiction of any 
state,” and then the burden then shifts to the defendant to show “either that one or 
more states exist in which it would be subject to suit or that its contacts with the 
United States are constitutionally insufficient.”  United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 
Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).  Appellants believe that the majority’s approach 
is the correct one.  However, that split is not implicated here because the back-and-
forth between plaintiff and defendant described in the text satisfies even the First 
Circuit’s more defendant-friendly approach. 
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To meet the constitutional due process requirements for personal jurisdiction, 
whether under Rule 4(k)(1) or Rule 4(k)(2), a defendant must have sufficient 
“minimum contacts” with the forum jurisdiction such that “the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Under Rule 4(k)(1), the 
inquiry focuses on the contacts with the relevant State—here, Virginia; under Rule 
4(k)(2) the inquiry focuses on contacts with the United States as a whole. 
This Court has distilled the constitutional “minimum contacts” test for 
specific jurisdiction into a three-part inquiry.
4
  First, the Court assesses “the extent 
to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities in the State.”  ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (alterations omitted).  Second, it 
determines whether “the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the 
State.”  Id.  And, third, it requires that the exercise of jurisdiction be “constitutionally 
reasonable.”  Id.; see also Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
The constitutional test for jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1) and Rule 4(k)(2) is 
largely the same, but the test under Rule 4(k)(2) is more forgiving in one important 
sense.  When deciding under Rule 4(k)(1) whether personal jurisdiction is 
                                           
4
 As the district court observed, appellants have not argued that appellee’s contacts 
with the state are sufficient to create general jurisdiction.  See J.A. 389. 
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appropriate, federalism concerns may affect the due process analysis.  See Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act 
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.” (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294)).  Those federalism concerns are entirely absent, 
however, when the question is whether personal jurisdiction exists in the United 
States as a whole, and the alternative to finding jurisdiction is that the defendant 
cannot be held accountable for his wrongdoing in any court in the Nation.  In any 
event, whether the forum is Virginia or the United States, nothing in the Constitution 
bars the exercise of jurisdiction here. 
A. Appellee has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing 
business in the United States and Virginia. 
1. Appellee has multiple and sustained contacts with the 
United States and Virginia. 
The “purposeful availment” inquiry is intended to prevent a defendant being 
“haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated 
contacts.”  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  The central question is whether the defendant has “fair warning that a 
particular activity may subject [him] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,” CFA 
Inst., 551 F.3d at 293 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472), or whether instead the 
defendant should be surprised at being required to “defend himself in a forum where 
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he should not have anticipated being sued,” Consulting Eng’rs, 561 F.3d at 277 
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).   
Recognizing that “[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of 
commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone 
a similar increase,” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958), this Court and 
others have adapted traditional notions of personal jurisdiction to situations in which 
a defendant’s contacts with a forum are in the form of electronic activity directed via 
the Internet.  To determine jurisdiction, this Court in ALS Scan “adopt[ed] and 
adapt[ed]” the framework set forth in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997), which situates websites along a 
spectrum marked by the guideposts “highly interactive,” “semi-interactive,” or 
“passive.”  In so doing, this Court recognized that the governing inquiry is a flexible 
one, premised not on rigid categorization, but instead on a careful and holistic 
inquiry into the “nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts 
over the Internet.”  ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 713 (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).  
As this Court summarized in ALS Scan:  
[A] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over 
a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic 
activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in 
business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity 
creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action 
cognizable in the State’s courts. 
293 F.3d at 714; see also Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 399. 
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Consistent with this framework, district courts within the Circuit (like courts 
elsewhere applying the Zippo analysis) have sought to determine the “manifest 
intent” of a website operator by examining a variety of factors, including the quantity 
of contacts a website has with a forum, the quality and nature of those contacts, and 
the overarching focus (commercial and otherwise) of a website’s activities.  See 
GMAC, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Bright Imperial Ltd. v. RT MediaSolutions, S.R.O., 
No. 1:11-cv-935, 2012 WL 1831536 at *6-7 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2012).  Applying 
this framework, and comparing appellee’s activities in the United States and Virginia 
to those of other defendants in cases concerning Internet jurisdiction, the district 
court’s error becomes plain. 
First, in 2018 alone, appellee’s websites had nearly 32 million users in the 
United States, 542,768 of whom were in Virginia.  Those U.S. users engaged in 96.2 
million sessions on the websites, 1.4 million of which were in Virginia.  That usage 
rendered the U.S. the websites’ third-biggest market by number of users and number 
of sessions. 
To be sure, the number of users is not, in and of itself, determinative of the 
jurisdictional inquiry.  But the fact that the United States is appellee’s third-biggest 
market and that the websites have tens of millions of U.S. users conducting almost 
a hundred million sessions in a single year—all of which is well known to appellee—
makes appellee’s claim of surprise at being sued in the U.S. hard to take seriously. 
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Uniform case law makes that clear.  In Keeton, for example, the Supreme 
Court held that regular monthly sales of thousands of magazines in New Hampshire 
sufficed to render a nationwide magazine subject to specific jurisdiction in that state.  
465 U.S. at 773-74.  As the Court explained, “[t]here is no unfairness in calling [a 
defendant] to answer for the contents of [its national] publication wherever a 
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”  Id. at 781.  In 
Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan courts 
could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania diagnostic testing business that had 
done business with 14 customers in Michigan.  282 F.3d 883, 891-92 (6th Cir. 2002).  
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that even when the contacts represented “an insignificant 
percentage of [defendant’s] overall business,” jurisdiction was appropriate because 
“the absolute amount of business conducted by [defendant] in Michigan represents 
something more than ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts’ with the state.”  Id. 
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (emphasis added).   
More recently, in Plixer, the First Circuit held that courts in Maine could 
exercise jurisdiction over a German website that sold its software analysis services 
to 156 residents of the United States.  905 F.3d at 4-5.  Citing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Keeton, the First Circuit reasoned that the “regular flow or regular course 
of sales” in the United States showed that the defendant could have “reasonably 
anticipated” the exercise of specific jurisdiction in the United States.  Id. at 10-11.  
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By contrast, in Carefirst, this Court held that Maryland courts could not exercise 
jurisdiction over an Illinois non-profit, in part, because the organization had received 
only 0.174% of its donations from Marylanders and exactly one donation from 
Maryland through its website—a donation which was made by the plaintiff’s own 
lawyer.  334 F.3d at 395, 401; see also be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558-59 
(7th Cir. 2011) (finding no purposeful exploitation of the Illinois market where “just 
20 persons who listed Illinois addresses had at some point created free dating 
profiles” on the website at issue).  All of these numbers pale in comparison to the 
millions of knowing transactions appellee has entered into with residents of the 
United States and Virginia. 
Because appellee cannot deny the almost hundred million sessions by U.S. 
users on his websites, he attempts to downplay the significance of these figures by 
noting that his online piracy venture is globally popular—available in over 200 
countries worldwide—and that the U.S. is “only” his third-biggest market with the 
majority of the websites users and sessions coming from the rest of the world.  See 
J.A. 42.  Appellee argues in essence that because his websites are available and 
popular everywhere he can be sued nowhere (except Rostov-on-Don).  
Unsurprisingly, no court has accepted this proposition, and multiple courts have 
explicitly rejected it.  See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 (holding that a publisher of “a 
national publication aimed at a nationwide audience” must reasonably anticipate 
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being haled into court “wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold 
and distributed” to answer for its contents); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 
647 F.3d 1218, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] website with national viewership and 
scope appeals to, and profits from, an audience in a particular state, the site’s 
operators can be said to have ‘expressly aimed’ at that state.”). 
Second, the nature of users’ millions of contacts with the websites confirms 
that the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate here.  If a website passively “makes 
information available” on the Internet, that alone is generally not a basis for 
jurisdiction.  Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 399; see also ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714 (finding 
no jurisdiction over a Georgia-based Internet service provider whose “only direct 
contact . . . with Maryland was through the general publication of its website on the 
Internet”).  By contrast, if a defendant “enters into contracts with residents of a 
foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.”  ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 713-
14 (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124); see also Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 
874 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding website through which users could register domain 
names a sufficient basis for jurisdiction); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. 
Casinoalitalia.Com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350 (E.D. Va. 2001).  
Here, the websites are anything but passive.  Users come to the site not just to 
access information, but to accomplish the “transmission of computer files over the 
31 
Internet.”  ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 713.  As alleged in the complaint, a user enters a 
YouTube (or other) URL into the websites’ input bars, and the websites then 
“extract[] the audio track from the YouTube video, convert[] it to an audio file, 
cop[y] the file to its servers . . . [and then] distribute[] the audio file directly from 
Defendants’ servers to the user’s computer.”  J.A. 21-22. 
While on the site, users often engage in repeated transactions.  They view 
multiple pages and download multiple files in a visit.  Users also tend to visit the site 
over and again.  See, e.g., J.A. 149, 154 (noting that there were three times as many 
U.S.-based sessions on the websites as there were U.S. users.). 
Those visits, moreover, are the subject of a formal legal relationship:  The 
websites require that prior to engaging in a stream-ripping session, users assent to 
“a contractual agreement between you [the user] and us [the websites]” setting forth 
the respective rights and obligations of websites and its users.  See Bright Imperial, 
2012 WL 1831536, at *6 (finding jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in a situation 
in which users were “required to agree to Terms and Conditions and purchase coins 
in order to view content on Defendants’ website”).  
The exchange of data between appellee’s websites and their users in multiple 
sessions pursuant to formal contracts, including the websites’ delivery of hundreds 
of millions of files to their users, demonstrates that an active, “ongoing,” 
“relationship” exists between appellee and his millions of users in the U.S. and 
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Virginia.  These factors place appellee’s conduct at exactly the opposite end of the 
spectrum from a “passive” website that does little more than post information or 
news for consumption by the entire Internet-accessing public. 
Third, the websites and their U.S. and Virginia users have a quintessential 
Internet-based commercial relationship.  To be sure, no cash changes hands between 
the websites and the users.  But that is hardly uncommon.  Indeed, many of the 
Internet’s most popular websites generate revenue not by directly charging users, 
but rather by enticing millions of users with “free” content and then selling 
advertising space to entities wishing to target this captive audience—Google, 
Facebook, ESPN, CNN, and others come quickly to mind.  See also Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 926-27, 939-40 (2005) 
(“Streamcast and Grokster make money by selling advertising space, by directing 
ads to the screens of computers employing their software”).  That is exactly how 
appellee’s websites make their money here. 
Moreover, for purposes of jurisdiction, it is critical that the advertising at issue 
here—like the advertising on countless other Internet websites—is targeted to users 
based on (among other things) their location.  On the Internet, websites and their 
advertisers can track the location of users and then tailor those advertisements 
accordingly.  Users in the United States thus may receive different ads for different 
products than their counterparts in (for example) France, China, and Brazil, and 
33 
users in Virginia may likewise receive different ads for different products than their 
counterparts in (for example) California and Texas.  Such “geo-targeting” of ads 
based on the location of their users is common. 
Geo-targeting of ads is exactly what happens here.  Appellants have alleged—
and appellee does not dispute—that the websites track the location of users and then 
sell that information (via ad-brokers) to advertisers who can use it to advertise 
products targeted specifically at tens of millions of Americans and millions of 
Virginians.  J.A. 11.  Appellee profits handsomely from these targeted 
advertisements.  J.A. 11; cf. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940 (relying on links between 
infringing acts of users and increased ad revenues for defendant to reject efforts of 
software maker to separate itself from the infringing acts of its users); see id. 
(emphasizing that “the more the software is used, the more ads are sent out, and the 
greater the advertising revenue becomes”). 
Nor is any of this a surprise, either to appellee or his users—indeed, users 
must agree to geo-targeting of advertisements before they can use the websites.  
Appellee’s Terms of Use provide expressly that the websites may collect “your IP 
address, country of origin and other non-personal information about your computer 
or device” and that the information may be used “to provide targeted advertising 
based on your country of origin and other personal information.”  J.A. 176, 178.  
Appellee’s websites simply do what their contracts with their users say they will. 
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Other courts have found that websites purposefully avail themselves of the 
privilege of conducting business within a forum for jurisdictional purposes by using 
precisely this type of “geo-location” technology.  For example, in Mavrix, the Ninth 
Circuit found a California court had specific jurisdiction over an Ohio corporation 
that ran a website publishing allegedly infringing photographs of celebrities.  In 
addressing the purposeful targeting of California through targeted advertisements, 
the court observed: 
Brand makes money by selling advertising space on its website to third-
party advertisers . . . [and a] substantial number of hits to Brand’s 
websites came from California residents.  One of the ways we know 
this is that some of the third-party advertisers on Brand’s website had 
advertisements directed to Californians.  In this context, it is immaterial 
whether the third-party advertisers or Brand targeted California 
residents.  The fact that the advertisements targeted California 
residents indicates that Brand knows—either actually or 
constructively—about its California user base, and that it exploits that 
base for commercial gain by selling space on its website for 
advertisements. 
647 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added).  Appellee’s websites are alleged to target the 
United States and Virginia in exactly the same way as the defendant in Mavrix, and 
thus appellee earns his substantial advertising revenues through “the privilege of 
conducting activities” in the United States and Virginia.  ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712. 
Fourth, Appellee’s purposeful availment is reflected in his failure to take any 
meaningful actions to block, restrict, or even discourage use of the websites by 
prospective users in the United States and Virginia.  For example, just as tracking 
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technology can be used to target specific populations so, too, can it be used to 
exclude specific populations by blocking access for users from a specific 
jurisdiction.  As the First Circuit recently noted, “[i]f a defendant tries to limit U.S. 
users’ ability to access the website . . . that is surely relevant to the intent not to serve 
the United States.”  Plixer, 905 F.3d at 9.  And, the failure to implement such 
technology is relevant, too: “[The defendant’s] failure to implement such 
restrictions, coupled with its substantial U.S. business, provides an objective 
measure of its intent to serve customers in the U.S. market and thereby profit.”  Id.; 
see also Spanski Enters., Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., 883 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 
2018) (imposing liability in the U.S. when a defendant purposefully turned off 
default territorial restrictions blocking U.S. access to a website); cf. Grokster, 545 
U.S. at 926-27, 939 (holding that file-sharing service’s intention to induce copyright 
infringement was evidenced by the fact that it “never blocked anyone from 
continuing to use its software” and never “attempted to develop filtering tools or 
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software”). 
Similarly, websites that truly wish to avoid availing themselves of the U.S. 
market can tailor their websites to the countries or markets they wish to target.  Thus, 
for example, courts have found a lack of purposeful availment in the United States 
when the website was not in English.  See, e.g., Triple Up Ltd. v. YouKu Tudou Inc., 
No. 17-7033, 2018 WL 4440459, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2018) (per curiam) 
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(website entirely in Mandarin Chinese); Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 450 (website in 
Spanish, listing prices in Spanish denominations, with goods only permitted to be 
shipped to Spain).  Here, of course, appellee has made his websites available to his 
users in English. 
In short, like the defendant in Plixer, appellee knows precisely where his users 
come from:  Exhibits 2 and 3 to his declaration demonstrate down to the person how 
many users the websites had from each country in the world and each of the fifty 
States.  But rather than using this information to avoid the U.S. market, he uses this 
information to sell ads that specifically target the market.  Appellee doubtless has 
compelling financial reasons for making this choice.  But having done so, he cannot 
claim surprise when he his forced to defend his facilitation of massive online piracy 
in U.S. courts.  See uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 428-29 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“GoDaddy is aware that it earns many millions of dollars annually from 
Illinois customers, and it cannot be unhappy to have had such success in the state.  
Its contacts cannot fairly be described as random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”). 
Fifth, appellee’s claims of surprise at being haled into U.S. courts are even 
more implausible given his decision to register a DMCA agent with the U.S. 
Copyright Office.  The sole purpose for such a registration is to seek to qualify for 
the DMCA safe harbor defense to claims of copyright infringement under U.S. law.  
17 U.S.C. § 512(c); Copyright.gov, DMCA Designated Agent Directory, 
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https://www.copyright.gov/dmca-directory/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (“[i]n order 
to qualify for safe harbor protection,” service providers “must designate an agent,” 
among other requirements).  And appellee’s websites reference the DMCA, citing 
“Title 17, Section 512(c) of the United States Code.”  J.A. 164, 172.  Appellee’s 
decision to register a DMCA agent is simply irreconcilable with his claim that he 
had no notion that his actions might subject him to suit within the United States.   
Sixth, other indicators of appellee’s repeated and sustained contacts with the 
United States and Virginia, when taken together, confirm that appellee has more than 
“purposefully availed [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities” in his third 
biggest market globally.  For example, appellee does not dispute that, to set up and 
operate the websites, he has engaged in numerous significant and repeated 
interactions with U.S.-based companies.  Appellee also does not dispute that he has 
contracted with at least one American advertising firm, Advertise.com, in order to 
sell space on the websites for the purpose of geo-targeted advertising.  J.A. 118, 151, 
154, 183, 185.  Appellee does not dispute that until recently his websites contracted 
with Amazon Web Services (an American company) to host the websites on front-
end servers based in Virginia.  J.A. 73, 118, 132-33.
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not dispute that he registered the domain names for the websites with GoDaddy.com, 
a U.S. company, and selected top-level domains for the websites that are 
administered by VeriSign, Inc., and Neustar, Inc., two U.S. companies 
headquartered in Virginia.  J.A. 187.   
In determining whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the 
privilege of doing business in a particular forum, courts have sensibly looked 
precisely to the question of whether a defendant has in fact contracted with a forum-
based business to operate its website.  See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126 (finding 
personal jurisdiction where a California site, inter alia, contracted with Pennsylvania 
ISPs to facilitate operation of news site); Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1222 (finding personal 
jurisdiction where an Ohio website with 12 million monthly U.S. users and 70 
million U.S. page views per month did business with advertising agency in 
California, a California wireless provider, a California web designer, and a 
California-based national news site). 
Finally, appellee has attempted to avail himself not merely of U.S. consumers 
and businesses, but of U.S. courts as well.  Appellee’s Terms of Use, which appellee 
deems a “contractual agreement between you and us” require that “for any claim 
brought by us against you, you agree to submit and consent to personal jurisdiction 
in and the venue of the courts in the Russian Federation and anywhere else you can 
be found.”  J.A. 166, 174.  Thus in 2018 alone, almost 32 million Americans agreed 
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to be sued by appellee in U.S. courts, and over 542,000 Virginians agreed to be sued 
by appellee in courts within this Circuit.  Having by “contract” attempted to secure 
his right to hale his users into U.S. and Virginia courts, appellee can hardly claim 
surprise when the owners of the copyrights pirated through his websites seek to 
confront him in those very same courts.  
2. The District Court erred in concluding that the Constitution 
foreclosed suit against appellee in Virginia or, indeed, 
anywhere in the United States. 
Notwithstanding this wealth of contacts with Virginia and the United States, 
the district court concluded that appellee had not availed himself of either 
jurisdiction because “the Websites are semi-interactive, the interactions with the 
users are non-commercial, and there were no other acts by the Defendant that would 
demonstrate purposeful targeting.”  J.A. 394.  The district court erred in its analysis 
at every turn. 
First, while not disputing that the websites have millions of U.S. users, the 
district court nevertheless dismissed in a single sentence the significance of those 
users because “the number of users cannot make a website highly interactive.”  
J.A. 392.  But the district court’s discussion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the relevant analysis.  Even assuming the websites are properly deemed to be not 
“highly interactive,” that conclusion is the beginning not the end of the analysis.  If 
a website is neither entirely passive (so that jurisdiction is generally lacking) nor 
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highly interactive (so that jurisdiction is clear), the court must examine the extent 
and nature of the contacts to determine whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  Treating 
the Zippo analysis as a rigid exercise to determine into which “category” the website 
falls (as the district court did here) cannot be squared either with Zippo, which has 
always required a fact-intensive inquiry into the extent and nature of the contacts, or 
with the Supreme Court’s due process cases, which likewise make clear the holistic 
nature of the inquiry. 
That error was critical here.  The number of contacts between a user and a 
website is highly relevant to the due process inquiry, yet the district court largely 
ignored those contacts.  See, e.g., uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 432-33 (“GoDaddy’s 
contacts with Illinois are extensive.  It has hundreds of thousands of customers in 
the state and earns millions of dollars in revenue from the state each year.”); Bird, 
289 F.3d at 875-76 (“Although the Dotster defendants might face a burden in having 
to defend a lawsuit in Ohio, they cannot reasonably object to this burden given that 
Dotster has allegedly transacted business with 4,666 Ohio residents.”).  The district 
court never explained how millions (or hundreds of millions) of contacts could be 
described as “random, fortuitous, or attenuated,” nor did the court explain why 
appellee should be surprised at being haled into court in what appellee knows is his 
third-biggest market globally. 
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Second, the district court’s analysis of the “ongoing relationship” between 
appellee’s websites and their users was doubly flawed.  At the outset, the district 
court again misapplied ALS Scan and Zippo, viewing the existence vel non of an 
“ongoing relationship” as relevant only to its determination that the websites were 
not “highly interactive”—the court never considered whether the nature of the 
relationship between the websites and their users was such that personal jurisdiction 
was nevertheless appropriate.  
In any event, the district court was wrong to conclude that there is no “ongoing 
relationship” between the websites and their users.  The district noted, for example, 
that the engagement between the websites and its users is not “prolonged,” because 
“the files transmitted between the Websites and users are only stored until the user 
has downloaded them.”  J.A. 392.  But it is undisputed that users made multiple visits 
to the sites, and that they download infringing files from appellee’s servers while 
they are there—collectively hundreds of millions of files.  The amount of time a file 
is stored on a particular server—particularly in an era in which computing and 
Internet speeds are increasing at exponential rates and speed is a selling point for 
websites—is simply not relevant to the question of whether the websites are engaged 
in “the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet.”  ALS 
Scan, 293 F.3d at 713. 
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Likewise, the district court was wrong to focus on the fact that “users do not 
need to create an account” to use stream-ripping tools.  J.A. 392.  As described 
above, users entered a contractual relationship with appellee’s websites, as they were 
required to agree to appellee’s Terms of Use prior to any use of the website.  Whether 
or not users had an “account” is a red herring. 
The fact is that users of appellee’s websites agree to contractual provisions set 
forth in the Terms of Use; that users visit the websites for extended periods of time; 
that the websites transmit multiple files to the users as part of the back-and-forth that 
is integral to the websites’ operation; and that users return again and again to illegally 
obtain copyrighted content.  That is an “ongoing relationship” between the websites 
and its users that cuts heavily in favor of jurisdiction.  
Third, the district court erred in concluding that the websites’ relationships 
with their users was “non-commercial.”  As the district court saw it, because “the 
Websites are free to use” for the users, any money the websites derive from the sale 
of advertising “cannot be the basis for finding a commercial relationship with the 
users because they are separate interactions.”  J.A. 393.  The district court’s analysis, 
however, is completely at odds with the nature of Internet commerce in the 21st 
century.  
As described above, many of the Internet’s most popular sites generate 
revenue not from directly charging users, but rather by enticing millions of users 
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with “free” content and then selling advertisements to entities wishing to target this 
captive audience.  A typical commercial arrangement on the Internet is thus a three-
way relationship:  Websites attract users with content; users access content on the 
websites and make available their “eyeballs” and “data”; and websites and their 
advertisers send ads to these “eyeballs,” often using user-specific data (such as 
location) to make the ads more effective.  To isolate the content from the revenue-
generating advertisements as the district court did here would be to say that Google, 
Facebook, Snapchat, and countless other Internet companies’ relationships with their 
users is non-commercial.  That position is absurd.    
Fourth, the district court dismissed much of the websites’ interactions with 
their users as irrelevant to the purposeful availment analysis because those actions 
were initiated by the users themselves.  For example, the district court set aside 
appellee’s use of geo-locational information because “[e]ven if the Websites’ servers 
knew exactly where the users were located,” J.A. 394, “tracking the location of a 
user does not show targeting of the users or their location; instead it is merely a 
recording of where the user’s unilateral act took place,” id.  But this reality—that 
Internet users can log onto a website from whatever location they choose—has 
sensibly been rejected as a basis for finding a lack of minimum contacts.  Indeed, in 
Zippo itself, the defendant argued “its contacts with Pennsylvania residents are 
fortuitous because Pennsylvanians happened to find its Web site or heard about its 
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news service elsewhere and decided to subscribe.”  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126.  But 
because every interaction on the Internet is user-initiated, Zippo found this argument 
“misconstrues the concept of fortuitous contacts.”  Id.  The defendant in Zippo 
“repeatedly and consciously chose to process Pennsylvania residents’ applications 
and to assign them passwords. . . .  The transmission of these files was entirely within 
[the defendant’s] control.” 
The Seventh Circuit likewise rejected this precise line of argument in uBID, 
623 F.3d at 428-29.  GoDaddy, an Internet domain-registration company with no 
physical presence but many customers in Illinois, argued that it was not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in that state because “its sales to Illinois residents are automated 
transactions unilaterally initiated by those residents.”  Id. at 428.  The Seventh 
Circuit squarely rejected GoDaddy’s efforts to pawn off responsibility for its 
contacts on its users, noting, “GoDaddy itself set the system up this way.  It cannot 
now point to its hundreds of thousands of customers in Illinois and tell us, ‘It was all 
their idea.’”  Id.  Appellee’s situation is identical in all relevant respects:  it knows 
it is facilitating millions of online piracy sessions in the U.S., is earning substantial 
revenue from ads targeted at U.S. users, and is taking no steps to limit U.S. access.  
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The fact that the reality of the Internet means that users “unilaterally” decide to go 
to the websites is irrelevant.
6
 
Finally, although the district court’s conclusion that due process forecloses 
the exercise of specific jurisdiction here is wrong with respect to appellee’s contacts 
with Virginia, it is especially wrong with respect to appellee’s contacts with the 
United States.  For not only are appellee’s contacts with the U.S. purposeful, 
numerous, and substantial, but the federalism concerns that have led the Supreme 
Court to limit the jurisdiction of one state to avoid interfering with the prerogatives 
of another are entirely absent.  Here, the result of the district court’s dismissal is not 
that the case may proceed in a sister State, but instead that the case may not proceed 
anywhere in the United States.  There is, in short, no U.S. forum at all for U.S. 
plaintiffs seeking to prevent the massive infringement on U.S. soil that appellee’s 
websites help U.S. users to accomplish.  That is precisely the sort of result that Rule 
                                           
6 Appellee’s use of his tracking information differs sharply from the cases upon 
which the district court relied.  In Intercarrier Communications LLC v. WhatsApp 
Inc., No. 3:12-cv-776, 2013 WL 5230631, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013), the 
defendant’s messaging application “d[id] not require a user to share his location” 
and there was no allegation that the defendant had ever used this functionality to 
target advertising at specific users based on their location.  In Zaletel v. Prisma Labs, 
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 599, 610 (E.D. Va. 2016), the defendant “d[id] not know the 
location of its app users.”  Here it is undisputed that appellee knew from where his 
users came. 
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4(k)(2) was intended to prevent.  On the facts here, appellee’s purposeful availment 
is clear, and the first prong of the due process analysis is met. 
B. Appellants’ claim arises directly out of appellee’s contacts with the 
United States and Virginia. 
It is likewise clear that the second prong of the analysis is met because “the 
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State,” ALS Scan, Inc., 
293 F.3d at 712.  The district court did not analyze this prong independently, and 
indeed appellee argued below that appellants’ claims did not arise from appellee’s 
contacts with Virginia or the United States because there were no such contacts.  As 
discussed at length above, that argument is demonstrably false, and the district 
court’s failure to construe facts in favor of the appellants on a motion to dismiss was 
error.  See supra 26-39.  Appellants’ claims under the Copyright Act arise from 
precisely these contacts and there is no reasonable dispute that there is “an affiliation 
between the forum,” be it Virginia or the United States, “and the underlying 
controversy.”  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). 
C. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellee is 
constitutionally reasonable. 
Because it erroneously found appellee had not purposefully targeted either the 
United States or Virginia, the district court likewise did not engage in a reasonability 
analysis, the third prong of the jurisdictional due process inquiry.  J.A. 394-95.  The 
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reasonability standard ensures that litigation in a given forum is not “so gravely 
difficult and inconvenient as to place the defendant at a severe disadvantage in 
comparison to his opponent.”  CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 296 (quoting Burger King, 471 
U.S. at 476) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 
303.  In making that assessment, this Court considers three factors:  (1) the burden 
on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum; and (3) the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining relief.  See id.  Although this inquiry is analytically distinct from the 
determination of whether a defendant purposefully targeted a particular jurisdiction, 
the underlying considerations are similar:  “the inequity of being haled into a foreign 
forum is mitigated if it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant could be 
subject to suit there.”  CFA Inst., 551 F.3d at 296.  As demonstrated at length above, 
in light of the appellee’s conduct in Virginia and the United States, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over appellee in the Eastern District of Virginia was more than 
reasonably foreseeable.   
First, as regards the burden on appellee to litigate a case in Virginia or the 
United States, foreign defendants are “not shielded from civil liability” just because 
they are located elsewhere.  Id.; see also Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 304-05.  Were this 
the case, U.S. jurisdiction over foreign defendants would never exist and Rule 
4(k)(2) would be a nullity.  Here, appellee has “repeatedly reached into the 
Commonwealth [and the United States] to transact business with it,” and has faced 
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no obstacles, practical or otherwise, in contracting with a host of Virginia- and U.S.-
based companies in order to engage in his online piracy.  CFA Inst., 551 F. 3d at 
296.  Moreover, appellee has secured able counsel that have been more than 
successful in defending his interests to date.  See id. (finding the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant reasonable in part because the defendant “has 
been able to secure counsel to represent its interests, and its litigation burden is thus 
no more substantial than that encountered by other entities that choose to transact 
business in Virginia”); Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 304 (same).   
In the district court, appellee noted he did not hold a U.S. visa and that “there 
are extended wait times to obtain a United States Visa as a result of the closing of a 
number of consulates within Russia.”  J.A. 57.  But whatever the fluctuating state of 
U.S.-Russian diplomatic relations may be, appellee’s ability to reach millions of U.S. 
users with his websites has been unhampered as has his counsel’s ability—even 
without appellee’s physical presence—to successfully litigate a Rule 12(b)(2) 
challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction.  That appellee may currently lack a U.S. 
visa simply does not suggest that his participation as a litigant in Virginia or U.S. 
courts would be problematic.   
Second, both Virginia and the United States have strong interests in the subject 
matter of this litigation.  As this Court has recognized, even when plaintiffs are “not 
Virginia companies, the state has an interest in ensuring that the nation’s copyright 
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and trademark laws are not violated within its borders.”  Tire Eng’g, 682 F.3d at 
305.  The appropriate vindication of copyright laws is particularly important because 
it “motivate[s] the creative activity of authors” while “giv[ing] the public appropriate 
access to their work product.”  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  Indeed, for that reason, other courts have recognized the 
importance of providing fora through which out-of-state plaintiffs can seek a remedy 
for any in-fora violations.  See, e.g., Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 259 F.3d at 218.   
Before the district court, appellee’s only response was to argue that the 
Copyright Act generally does not apply extraterritorially.  But the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is a red herring.  Appellee is transmitting infringing 
material from his websites to over 542,000 users in Virginia and nearly 32 million 
users in the United States.  The copyright violations at issue have occurred, and have 
effects, in the United States, rendering the application of the Copyright Act here 
domestic, not extraterritorial.  See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd. 
34 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming the finding of copyright infringement 
where Taiwanese defendants imported unauthorized copies of video game cartridges 
into the United States); Spanski, 883 F.3d at 910-16 (holding that a Polish website 
was liable under the Copyright Act for directing copyrighted content to U.S.-based 
viewers on demand).   
50 
Third, appellants have a strong interest in resolving this dispute either in 
Virginia or in the United States.  The case involves U.S. intellectual property stolen 
from U.S. plaintiffs by U.S. website users using websites operated by an appellee 
who has registered a DMCA agent with the U.S. Copyright Office to protect himself 
for claims of infringement under U.S. law and whose websites transmit digital files 
into the U.S.  Before the district court, appellee predicted that appellants “would 
undoubtedly face their own burdens in having to litigate their claims against Mr. 
Kurbanov in Russia.”  J.A. 58.  That is, at best, a gross understatement.  In any event, 
upholding the district court’s ruling would give appellee and every other foreign-
based online piracy venture complete immunity from U.S. courts, and the impact on 
U.S. copyrights in general, and appellants’ copyrights in particular, would be 
devastating.  The law not only does not require this incongruous outcome, it 
mandates the opposite one.    
III. The District Court Erred by Denying Appellants Any Opportunity to 
Conduct Jurisdictional Discovery. 
For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s decision that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant should be reversed.  But, should this Court 
have any doubt on that score (which it should not), at a minimum this case should 
be remanded for jurisdictional discovery. 
“Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is broad in scope and 
freely permitted.”  Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 402.  Although discovery may be denied 
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when plaintiffs have offered “only speculation or conclusory assertions” about the 
potential fruits of jurisdictional discovery, see id., or when plaintiffs have had 
“ample opportunity to take discovery,” Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 
F.3d 56, 64 (4th Cir. 1993), this Court has noted that it would be error to deny 
jurisdictional discovery where “there was no discovery conducted before the 
dismissals, even though such discovery might have shed light on the jurisdictional 
issues.”  See Benham v. City of Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 139 (4th Cir. 2011).  Other 
circuits likewise have remanded for jurisdictional discovery in Internet jurisdiction 
cases under these conditions.  See infra 53-54.  
Here, the record already contains a wealth of information about appellee’s 
electronic contacts with users in Virginia and the United States, his knowledge of 
those contacts, appellee’s efforts to exploit these markets by collecting and using 
location data for geo-targeted advertising, and appellee’s efforts to advance his 
stream-ripping websites by doing business with various entities in Virginia and the 
United States.  This information suffices to make out a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction; at the very least, it paints a picture of a mass-scale music piracy 
operation that has facilitated millions of transactions in Virginia and the United 
States that are anything but random or fortuitous.   
Under these circumstances, jurisdictional discovery would very likely reveal 
additional probative information about appellee’s contacts with Virginia and the 
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United States.  First, discovery would reveal further information about the nature of 
appellee’s dealings with businesses and the government in Virginia and the United 
States, including his dealings with American advertisers, not to mention his decision 
to register a DMCA agent with the U.S. Copyright Office.  Second, discovery would 
shed further light on appellee’s collection and use of location data, including the 
extent to which he uses that data for geo-targeted advertising.  Third, discovery 
(particularly in the form of internal communications and communications with third-
party vendors) would reveal the extent to which appellee consciously exploited the 
Virginia and United States markets.  All of this information would be probative for 
the district court’s purposeful availment inquiry.  These are precisely the 
circumstances under which a district court should grant plaintiffs an opportunity to 
take discovery.  That is all the more true here, given that the district court granted 
appellee’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and before the parties had conducted 
any discovery at all. 
Indeed, courts of appeals have remanded for jurisdictional discovery in 
situations where the appellant had presented a far weaker prima facie case for 
personal jurisdiction.  For example, in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth 
Corp., the appellee claimed that the appellants had engaged in a conspiracy “to 
dominate the Internet business directories’ market” by diverting web traffic to their 
websites.  199 F.3d 1343, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  The appellee also contended that 
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the appellants were subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia 
because they had operated directory websites that were accessible to the District’s 
residents.  Id. at 1345-46.  The D.C. Circuit held that the appellee had failed to make 
out a prima facie case for jurisdiction given that “[w]e do not even know for certain 
which defendants own and operate which websites.”  Id. at 1352.  Nevertheless, the 
court held that “[j]urisdictional discovery will help sort out these matters” and that 
the appellee “is entitled to pursue precisely focused discovery aimed at addressing 
matters related to personal jurisdiction.”  Id. 
Similarly, in Toys “R” Us, Inc., 318 F.3d at 455-57, the Third Circuit held 
that the district court erred by refusing to allow jurisdictional discovery on the 
appellees’ non-Internet contacts, id. at 456, such as whether “the [appellee] 
intentionally and knowingly transacted business with residents of the forum state” 
or “had significant other contacts with the forum besides those generated by its 
website.”  Id. at 453.  Although the record did not contain sufficient evidence of such 
contacts for the purposes of appellant’s prima facie case, the Third Circuit observed 
that the record “contained sufficient non-frivolous allegations (and admissions) to 
support the request for jurisdictional discovery.”  Id. at 456.  Accordingly, the Third 
Circuit held that the appellant should have an opportunity to explore the appellees’ 
“business plans for purchases, sales and marketing” and whether the appellees’ non-
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Internet contacts “directly facilitate” its alleged trademark infringement and unfair 
competition.  Id. at 457. 
If this Court does not reverse the district court’s decision, appellants should 
have the same opportunity as parties in the aforementioned cases to conduct 
jurisdictional discovery.  
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss should be 
reversed or, in the alternative, vacated and remanded for jurisdictional discovery. 
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